Table of Contents
CONTENTS
List of Illustrations and Tables ix
Member List xi
Staff List xiii–xiv
Preface xv
1. “WE HAVE SOME PLANES” 1
1.1 Inside the Four Flights 1
1.2 Improvising a Homeland Defense 14
1.3 National Crisis Management 35
2. THE FOUNDATION OF THE NEW TERRORISM 47
2.1 A Declaration of War 47
2.2 Bin Ladin’s Appeal in the Islamic World 48
2.3 The Rise of Bin Ladin and al Qaeda (1988–1992) 55
2.4 Building an Organization, Declaring
War on the United States (1992–1996) 59
2.5 Al Qaeda’s Renewal in Afghanistan (1996–1998) 63
3. COUNTERTERRORISM EVOLVES 71
3.1 From the Old Terrorism to the New:
The First World Trade Center Bombing 71
3.2 Adaptation—and Nonadaptation—
in the Law Enforcement Community 73
3.3 . . . and in the Federal Aviation Administration 82
3.4 . . . and in the Intelligence Community 86
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3.5 . . . and in the State Department and the Defense Department 93
3.6 . . . and in the White House 98
3.7 . . . and in the Congress 102
4. RESPONSES TO AL QAEDA’S INITIAL ASSAULTS 108
4.1 Before the Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania 108
4.2 Crisis:August 1998 115
4.3 Diplomacy 121
4.4 Covert Action 126
4.5 Searching for Fresh Options 134
5. AL QAEDA AIMS AT THE AMERICAN HOMELAND 145
5.1 Terrorist Entrepreneurs 145
5.2 The “Planes Operation” 153
5.3 The Hamburg Contingent 160
5.4 A Money Trail? 169
6. FROM THREAT TO THREAT 174
6.1 The Millennium Crisis 174
6.2 Post-Crisis Reflection: Agenda for 2000 182
6.3 The Attack on the USS Cole 190
6.4 Change and Continuity 198
6.5 The New Administration’s Approach 203
7. THE ATTACK LOOMS 215
7.1 First Arrivals in California 215
7.2 The 9/11 Pilots in the United States 223
7.3 Assembling the Teams 231
7.4 Final Strategies and Tactics 241
8. “THE SYSTEM WAS BLINKING RED” 254
8.1 The Summer of Threat 254
8.2 Late Leads—Mihdhar, Moussaoui, and KSM 266
9. HEROISM AND HORROR 278
9.1 Preparedness as of September 11 278
9.2 September 11, 2001 285
9.3 Emergency Response at the Pentagon 311
9.4 Analysis 315
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10. WARTIME 325
10.1 Immediate Responses at Home 326
10.2 Planning for War 330
10.3 “Phase Two” and the Question of Iraq
11. FORESIGHT—AND HINDSIGHT
11.1 Imagination 339
11.2 Policy 348
11.3 Capabilities 350
11.4 Management 353
334
339
12. WHAT TO DO? A GLOBAL STRATEGY 361
12.1 Reflecting on a Generational Challenge 361
12.2 Attack Terrorists and Their Organizations 365
12.3 Prevent the Continued Growth of Islamist Terrorism 374
12.4 Protect against and Prepare for Terrorist Attacks 383
13. HOW TO DO IT? A DIFFERENT WAY OF
ORGANIZING THE GOVERNMENT 399
13.1 Unity of Effort across the Foreign-Domestic Divide 400
13.2 Unity of Effort in the Intelligence Community 407
13.3 Unity of Effort in Sharing Information 416
13.4 Unity of Effort in the Congress 419
13.5 Organizing America’s Defenses in the United States 423
Appendix A: Common Abbreviations 429
Appendix B:Table of Names 431
Appendix C: Commission Hearings 439
Notes 449
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
AND TABLES
p. 15 FAA Air Traffic Control Centers
p. 15 Reporting structure, Northeast Air Defense Sector
p. 32–33 Flight paths and timelines
p. 49 Usama Bin Ladin
p. 64 Map of Afghanistan
p. 148 Khalid Sheikh Mohammed
p. 238–239 The 9/11 hijackers
p. 279 The World Trade Center Complex as of 9/11
p. 284 The World Trade Center radio repeater system
p. 288 The World Trade Center North Tower stairwell with deviations
p. 312 The Twin Towers following the impact of American Airlines
Flight 11 and United Airlines Flight 175
p. 313 The Pentagon after being struck by American Airlines Flight 77
p. 313 American Airlines Flight 93 crash site, Shanksville, Pennsylvaniap. 413 Unity of effort in managing intelligence
