Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-1976

Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-1976

by James R. Stocker
Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-1976

Spheres of Intervention: US Foreign Policy and the Collapse of Lebanon, 1967-1976

by James R. Stocker

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Overview

In Spheres of Intervention, James R. Stocker examines the history of diplomatic relations between the United States and Lebanon during a transformational period for Lebanon and a time of dynamic changes in US policy toward the Middle East. Drawing on tens of thousands of pages of declassified materials from US archives and a variety of Arabic and other non-English sources, Stocker provides a new interpretation of Lebanon's slide into civil war, as well as insight into the strategy behind US diplomatic initiatives toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. During this period, Stocker argues, Lebanon was often a pawn in the games of larger powers. The stability of Lebanon was an aim of US policy at a time when Israel’s borders with Egypt and Jordan were in active contention. Following the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the internal political situation in Lebanon became increasingly unstable due to the regional military and political stalemate, the radicalization of the country’s domestic politics, and the appearance of Palestinian militias on Lebanese territory. US officials were more deeply involved in Lebanese affairs than most outside the region realized. After a series of internal crises in 1969, 1970, and 1973, civil war broke out in Lebanon in 1975. The conflict reached a temporary halt after a Syrian military intervention the following year, but this was only an end to the first stage of what would be a sixteen-year civil war. During these crises, the US sought to help the Lebanese government in a variety of ways, including providing military aid to the Lebanese military, convincing Arab countries to take measures to help the Lebanese government, mediating Lebanon’s relations with Israel, and even supporting certain militias.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781501700774
Publisher: Cornell University Press
Publication date: 05/01/2016
Pages: 296
Product dimensions: 6.20(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.20(d)
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

James R. Stocker is Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Trinity Washington University.

Table of Contents

Introduction: "This Is the American Policy"
US Interests in Lebanon
Causes of the Lebanese Civil War
The Course of the Conflict, 1975–76

1. Sparks in the Tinderbox: The United States, the June War, and the Remaking of the Lebanese Crisis
Lebanese Domestic Tensions on the Eve of the June War
The United States and Lebanon in the 1960s
Lebanon's Six Day War
Pepsi-Cola Hits the Spot
The Beirut Airport Raid 2. Compromise in Cairo: The Nixon Administration and the Cairo Agreement "Trying to Be Helpful"
The August Attacks and the Rogers Plan
October Crisis and the Cairo Agreement

3. From Cairo to Amman: The United States and Lebanese Internal Security Post-Cairo US Assistance to Lebanon
Implementing the Cairo Agreement
The Kahhale Ambush and the Exodus from the South
Causes of the Calm 4. Plus ça change: International Terrorism, Détente, and the May 1973 Crisis
The New International Terrorism
A New Request for Support
The Israeli Raid on Beirut and the May Crisis
The Aftermath 5. Reckoning Postponed: From the October War to the Civil War
The October War and the Start of Negotiations
Lebanese Domestic Politics after the October War
Diplomacy on the Rocks

6. Disturbing Potential: The United States and the Renewed Conflict
The Outbreak of Conflict
The Military Cabinet and Syrian Mediation
Sinai II and the Resumption of Violence in Lebanon
The January Cease-Fire 7. Reluctant Interveners: The Red Line Agreement and Brown’s Mediation
The Constitutional Document and Shifting Alignments
The Non-Negotiation of the Red Line
The Brown Mission and the PLO
From Election to Intervention 8. Taking Its Course: The Syrian Intervention and Its Limits
Reacting to the Syrian Intervention
Assassinations and Evacuations
The New US-Syrian Dialogue
The Second Syrian Military Offensive and the End of the Conflict
Red Line Redux? Epilogue: The Cycle Continues

What People are Saying About This

Salim Yaqub

As we survey the current turmoil in the Middle East, we are all the more in need of careful, dispassionate, and insightful historical scholarship on US interactions with that region, and particularly with the small but pivotal nation of Lebanon. James R. Stocker gives us that, and more. Spheres of Intervention is a richly researched, perceptive, and skillfully crafted book about a diplomatic relationship that has powerfully shaped Middle Eastern politics down to our own day. Resourcefully mining recently declassified US government documents, and incorporating Arabic- and French-language sources seldom found in Anglophone accounts, Stocker provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date treatment we have of official US involvement in the Lebanese civil war of 1975–1976.

Paul Salem

Spheres of Intervention is a necessary and very valuable contribution to our knowledge about Lebanon's recent history, Lebanese-American relations, and US Mideast foreign policy. This book is a must-read for those with a special interest in Lebanon and for historians of US policy in the Middle East. In the first book to take extensive advantage of the declassified US diplomatic cables of the period, James R. Stocker fills an important gap in our understanding of Lebanon’s foreign relations during the decade and a half leading to its collapse in 1975.

William B. Quandt

Before the collapse of the state in Iraq, Syria, Libya, and Yemen there was Lebanon's descent into prolonged and costly civil war. James R. Stocker has meticulously examined the record of US involvement in Lebanon’s drift toward war in the years 1967–1976. He rightly concludes that Lebanon per se was rarely central in the thinking of American policymakers, especially Henry Kissinger. But what the United States did or did not do in the surrounding region had important spillover effects in Lebanon. The unwillingness of the United States to tackle the Palestinian issue, which was of key importance to the Lebanese, meant that it was very hard to stabilize Lebanon once the civil war began in earnest in 1975. This is a sobering account of the destruction of a country on the margins of American grand strategy. Today’s crises in the Middle East have far too many resemblances to the story told so authoritatively in these pages.

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