Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East

by Michael B. Oren Narrated by Robert Whitfield

Overview

In Israel and the West, it is called the Six Day War. In the Arab world, it is known as the June War, or simply as “the Setback.” Never has a conflict so short, unforeseen, and largely unwanted by both sides so transformed the world. The Yom Kippur War, the war in Lebanon, the Camp David accords, the controversy over Jerusalem and Jewish settlements in the West Bank, the intifada, and the rise of Palestinian terror are all part of the outcome of those six days of intense Arab-Israeli fighting in the summer of 1967.

Writing with a novelist's command of narrative and a historian's grasp of fact and motive, Michael B. Oren spotlights all the participants-Arab, Israeli, Soviet, and American-that were involved in this earth-shaking clash. Drawing on thousands of top-secret documents and exclusive personal interviews, he recreates the regional and international context that, by the late 1960s, virtually assured an Arab-Israeli conflagration.

A towering work of history and an enthralling human narrative, Six Days of War is the most important book on the Middle East conflict to appear in a generation.

Editorial Reviews

Vito F Sinisi

As the Middle East reels from wave after wave of terrorist attacks and seemingly endless reprisals, Michael B. Oren, an acknowledged expert on that troubled region, takes us back to the events of "Six-Day War" of June 1967 and shows how what transpired then deeply affects what is happening there now.

Publishers Weekly

This is the most complete history to date of the Six Day War of 1967, in which Israel entered and began its occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While no account can be definitive until Arab archives open, Oren, a Princeton-trained senior fellow at Jerusalem's Shalem Center who has served as director of Israel's department of inter-religious affairs and as an adviser to Israel's U.N. delegation, utilizes newly available archival sources and a spectrum of interviews with participants, including many Arabs, to fill gaps and correct misconceptions. Further, Six Days of War is an attack on "post-Zionism": the school of politics and history that casts Israel as the author of policies that intentionally promote the destuction of Palestine as a separate entity and of Palestinians as a people, not least through the occupation that began with the 1967 War. By contrast, Oren convincingly establishes in an often engrossing narrative the reactive, contingent nature of Israeli policy during both the crisis preceding the conflict and the war itself. As Prime Minister Levi Eshkol held the Israeli Defense Forces in check that May, Operation Dawn, an Egyptian plan for a preemptive strike against Israel, came within hours of implementation. It was canceled only because Egypt's President Gamal Abdel Nasser feared it had been compromised. Israel's decision to seek its own security in arms was finally triggered, Oren shows, by Jordan's late accession to the hostile coalition dominated by Egypt and Syria. Geographically, the West Bank, then under Jordanian rule and occupation, cut Israel nearly in half. The military risk to Israel was unacceptable, Oren makes clear, in the context of a U.S. enmeshed in Vietnam and a West unwilling to act even in support of the status quo. Far from being a product of strategic calculation, Oren further argues, occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was also contingent: the consequence of a victory so rapid and one-sided that even Israel's generals found it difficult to believe it was happening. Israel, having proved it could not be defeated militarily and now possessing something to trade, hoped for comprehensive peace negotiations in a rational-actor model. Oren notes that some initiatives for peace did in fact develop. He seems, however, trying to convince himself along with his readers. Oren puts what he sees as Israel's enduring weaknesses in relief: not arrogance, but self-doubt, self-analysis and self-criticism, all carried to near-suicidal degrees in 1967. Arab policy, by contrast, featured a confident commitment to erasing Israel from the map. The Six Day War shook that confidence, he finds, but did not alter the commitment. About the nature of Israeli policy since the war, the book says little, but finds that "for all its military conquests, Israel was still incapable of imposing the peace it craved." Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information.

Library Journal

In perhaps one of the most valuable recent works on this subject, Oren, a scholar and Senior Fellow at the Shalem Center, Jerusalem, details events from the Six Day War known in the Arab world as Al-Naksah (the setback) or simply the June war. The book's value lies in its focus and extensive documentation of multilingual resources, including archives, newspapers, reports, books, interviews, and Internet sites. In addition, Oren covers the international, regional, and domestic implications of the war and uses maps to illustrate the geographical changes and military strategies. Many books, e.g., Ahron Bregman's Israel's War: 1947-1993, Tibi Bassam's Conflict and War in the Middle East, 1967-91, and Eric Hammel's Six Days in June, cover a broader period, rely heavily on analysis, or fall short of objectivity. While Oren also recounts some necessary historical context for understanding the war's catalysts and discussing its aftermath, he primarily focuses on the pivotal six days of conflict, dedicating a full chapter for each day. Predictably, the most controversial information is his new findings on an Egyptian top-secret plan that came very close to eradicating Israel's army and nuclear power plant. While this is an essential addition for academic libraries, the book's exhaustive documentary style makes it a lesser candidate for public libraries. Ethan Pullman, Univ. of Pittsburgh Lib. Copyright 2002 Cahners Business Information.

Kirkus Reviews

A thoroughgoing analysis of the events that combusted 35 years ago to produce a maelstrom in the Middle East. Readers comparing historian Oren's thesis to current headlines may feel a certain sense of deja vu. He traces the origins of the Six-Day War of 1967 to several causes that were in no way resolved by the conflict, and underlines one of its effects-the Israeli conquest of the Sinai peninsula and the West Bank-that remains a subject of controversy today. One of those causes was resurgent nationalism in the Arab world's "postcolonial, revolutionary period," when Egyptian president Nasser attempted to play the Soviet Union off against the US, and to craft a military and political union of Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt; Nasser's United Arab Republic soon collapsed, but among the unintended consequences of the destabilization were the rise of the Assad regime in Syria and, eventually, Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Another was a sudden upsurge of Palestinian nationalist activity, leading to the formation of groups such as al-Fatah and the PLO. Still another was internal conflict in Israel over whether and how to accommodate the demands of its neighbors. Slowly taking shape throughout the early and mid-1960s, these conditions "created an atmosphere of extreme flammability," Oren writes. "In such an atmosphere, it would not take much-a terrorist attack, a reprisal raid-to unleash a process of unbridled escalation, a chain reaction of dare and counterdare, gamble and miscalculation, all leading inexorably to war." Of course, that is exactly what happened, and Oren's narrative traces the military course of the war and its political aftermath, including lingering tensions in US-Israeli relations following the (accidental, in Oren's view) Israeli attack on the US naval vessel Liberty. Careful and well documented: Oren (Senior Fellow/Shalem Center, Jerusalem) finds fault on all sides of the conflict, which is sure to earn him critics everywhere he turns. Essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the history of the troubled region.

From the Publisher

"An excellent new history of the 1967 war."—David Remnick, The New Yorker

"In Michael Oren's richly detailed and lucid account, the familiar story is thrilling once again....What makes this book important is the breadth and depth of the research...[H]e uses many Arab memoirs and accounts, giving the book a balanced tone and offering fascinating new details. 'Six Days of War,' coming soon after Israel—on a 30 year declassification rule—opened its archies on 1967, is a powerful rendering of what has turned out to be a world-historical event."—Gary J. Bass, The New York Times Book Review

"This is a masterly book....With a remarkably assured style, Oren elucidates nearly every aspect of the conflict....In writing his strategic chronicle, Oren has also drawn the most penetrating and subtle assessment of the Israeli mind that I've encountered....Oren's will remain the authoritative chronicle of the war. His achievement as a writer and a historian is awesome."—Ben Schwarz, The Atlantic Monthly

"In addition to being a highly readable, even gripping account of the 1967 conflict, Mr. Oren's 'Six Days of War' is also a powerful illustration of the way history mixes basic forces with the accidental and the improvisational....Provides fabulous richness of detail, including fly-on-the-wall accounts of the words and actions of many of the principal actors in places like Moscow and Washington, Damascus, Tel Aviv, and Cairo....He has woven a seamless narrative out of a staggering variety of diplomatic and military strands....Tragedy is character, as the Greeks understood, and Mr. Oren's masterly account shows how apt that insight is to the tragedy-afflicted Middle East, past and present."—Richard Bernstein, The New York Times

"A first-rate new account of the conflict."—Michael Kelly, Washington Post

"A magisterial work that is not only riveting reading, but also likely to become the standard work on the war that shaped the contemporary Middle East."—Jack Fischel, Philadelphia Inquirer

"This is not only the best book so far written on the Six Day War, it is likely to remain the best."—Geoffry Wheatcroft, Washington Post Book World

"The most comprehensive chronicle of this crucial turning point in contemporary Middle East history....An elegantly detailed, often riveting account."—Suzy Hansen, Chicago Sun-Times

"The timing, alas, is perfect. Michael Oren's definitive history of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its aftermath is sure to be the must-read in the White House this month."—New York Magazine

"There have been many books written on the Six Day War, none breaks new ground like this magnificent book does."—Fouad Ajami, NPR

"Oren's book is magisterial. It seems destined to be the definitive study for a long time to come....A rare literary accomplishment—making an oft-told story come alive again."—Ron Grossman, The Chicago Tribune

"This account of how Israel took the West Bank from Jordan, as they grabbed Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria, is unlikely to be surpassed, so thorough is the research and so compelling the analysis."—Lawrence Freedman, Times Literary Supplement

"As complete an account of the 1967 war as is ever likely to be written. In addition to providing the definitive history of that conflict, 'Six Days of War' offers a valuable perspective on the current troubles in the region."—Newsday

"The brilliance of Oren's work is not in the analysis of how the lightning-quick Israeli victory over Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in 1967 established the foundation for current events....Where the American-born historian excels in 'Six Days of War' is mining dozens of interviews with Arab battlefield leaders and recently released documents from governments in Israel and Russia to provide what might be the most complete synthesis yet of what preceded all the shooting....Oren's account of the 1967 war stands apart."—Scott Bernard Nelson, The Boston Globe

"Tells the story in gripping detail....One particular virtue of Oren's book is that it pays full attention to the international dimension of the conflict, especially the concerns and the actions of the two superpowers. This allows Oren to set what was in one sense a very local war into its wider context....This book should now be considered the standard work of reference."—Tony Judt, The New Republic

"The definitive study of how we got to where we are in the current Middle East conflict. For anyone interested in facts rather than propaganda, this is it."—Linda Grant, The Guardian

"Masterful and thrilling....Oren's beautifully modulated account of the war, which is drawn from the historical archives of four countries, offers an implicit explanation of the inability or refusal of the U.S. and other Western countries to take Osama bin Laden all that seriously before September 11."—John Podhoretz, National Review

"A near masterpiece of judicious but captivating history....Six Days of War turns out to be a far better guide to the present crisis than what we read and hear daily from our historically ignorant columnists and pundits."—Victor Davis Hanson, Commentary

"In masterly fashion, Oren, an Israeli historian, describes how one move led to another, complete with the accidents and misunderstandings inherent in diplomatic and military manoeuvrings. He has thoroughly explored Israel, American and Russian archives, and made use of such Arab material as exists...while supplementing his narrative by interviewing many who played a part, large or small. This admirable book is likely to be the last word on the six-day war for a long time."—David Pryce-Jones, The Sunday Times (London)

"The finest book ever on this topic."—Daniel Pipes, National Post (Ontario)

"A meticulous, blow-by-blow history....Altogether a serious and important work....Michael Oren's 'Six Days of War' is a key volume—both to remind us how the modern Middle East came into existence and to teach us what kind of war we are no longer able to fight."—Amitai Etzioni, Weekly Standard

"An elegantly detailed, often riveting account; Oren utilizes formerly top-secret documents to explore the military and diplomatic intricacies."—Salon.com

"The most detailed, the most comprehensive and by far the best-documented history that we have on this short but fateful war....The result is a fast-moving and action-packed narrative that sheds a great deal of new light on all the major participants in the war and on the conflict and cooperation between them."—The Guardian

"This is the most comprehensive history yet of a lightning conflict which devastated the Arab forces of Egypt, Syria and Jordan, dramatically redrew the borders of the Middle East, and still casts its dark shadow over the region today....Six Days of War scores highly in telling an extremely complicated story within a narrative which, despite being loaded with a crushing volume of research, reads at times like the breeziest blockbuster."—Financial Times

"A breathtaking history of the 1967 War....Oren is a profoundly talented writer: his grasp and retelling of events, both familiar and unknown, is phenomenal. This book is not only one of the best books in this critical episode in Middle East history; it's one of the best-written books I've read this year, in any genre."—Matthew Miller, Jerusalem Post

"This is the most complete history to date of the Six Day War of 1967....Further, Six Days of War is an attack on 'post Zionism': the school of politics and history that casts Israel as the author of policies that intentionally promote the destruction of Palestine as a separate entity and of Palestinians as a people, not least through the occupation that began with the 1967 War. By contrast, Oren convincingly establishes in an often engrossing narrative the reactive, contingent nature of Israeli policy during both the crisis preceding the conflict and the war itself....This book could very well hit the bestseller list."—Publishers Weekly (boxed, starred review)

"Oren's exciting diplomatic and military history of these events cleverly moves back and forth between the smoke filled rooms in Tel Aviv, Cairo, Amman, Damascus, Moscow, and Washington and the battlefields in the Sinai, Golan Heights and the West Bank where the fate of the Middle East and the world was being decided."—Rocky Mountain News

"The Six Day War had, and still has, a great influence on Israel, its neighbors, and the current events in the Middle East. Michael B. Oren has presented a detailed and multi-perspective picture of the events and dynamics of that period. It is a significant step toward a better understanding of our national and regional history. Hopefully, such understanding may assist us in reaching peace in the Middle East."—Ehud Barak

"One of the most valuable recent works on the subject....The book's value lies in its focus and extensive documentation of multilingual resources, including archives, newspapers, reports, books, interviews, and Internet sites. In addition, Oren covers the international, regional, and domestic implications of the war and uses maps to illustrate the geographical changes and military strategies...[A]n essential addition."—Library Journal

"Michael Oren has taken a fresh and even-handed look at Israel's seminal Six Day War, utilizing recently declassified secret documents, interviews and painstaking research."—Henry Kissinger

"A thoroughgoing analysis of the events that combusted 35 years ago to produce a maelstrom in the Middle East....Oren finds fault on all sides of the conflict, which is sure to earn him critics everywhere he turns. Essential reading for anyone seeking to understand the history of the troubled region."—Kirkus Reviews

"Michael Oren has combined a scholar's sense of thoroughness with a novelist's sense of drama in writing this polished and gripping history of the 1967 war. Using as many sources as are likely to be available, he has constructed the best account yet of the most momentous event in the modern Middle East—six days that shook the world."—Fareed Zakaria, Editor, Newsweek International

"Michael Oren has written what is surely the definitive history of the Six Day War: Of course he has examined easily accessible archives but he has also penetrated the files and memories of those who normally impede research in order to make getting at the truth extremely difficult. His narrative is precise but written with great literary flair. The Six Day War is an oft-told tale, but in no one else's study is there more understanding or more surprise."—Martin Peretz, Publisher, The New Republic

DEC 03/JAN 04 - AudioFile

The June 1967 Six Day War temporarily tripled the size of Israel and shook the world of superpower diplomacy. Oren sets out to present the most thoroughly researched study yet of the event, its leading players, and the events that led up to it. He succeeds beautifully. A striking insight is that Arab bombast was a significant factor in the Arab defeat--they were dazed by and believed their own propaganda, and that led to disaster. Oren is not only a lucid, compelling writer, but reader Robert Whitfield is a master at narrative drive through intonation alone. The listener cannot put this book down. A triumph. D.R.W. © AudioFile 2003, Portland, Maine

Product Details

BN ID:	2940169688979
Publisher:	Blackstone Audio, Inc.
Publication date:	06/24/2005
Edition description:	Unabridged
Sales rank:	1,066,995

Read an Excerpt

Afterwood

MORE THAN TWO YEARS HAVE PASSED since the outbreak of the latest Middle Eastern turmoil, and there is still no cease-fire in sight. Called by Palestinians the al-Aqsa Intifada, and by the Israelis the "disturbances," the "events," or, simply, the Palestinian terror, the violence that erupted in September 2000, and which has raged ever since, is in every sense a war. No less than in 1948 and 1967, Arabs and Israelis are today once again battling over the final disposition of the area known in Arabic as Filastin and in Hebrew as Eretz Yisrael—the Land of Israel. As in the processes leading up to previous Arab-Israeli confrontations, mounting violence between Palestinians and Israelis threatens to set the entire region ablaze.

In many respects, the current fighting resembles the civil war in Palestine
that broke out in November 1947, following the UN's decision to partition the
country into independent Jewish and Arab states. The Zionist leadership accepted
the notion of territorial compromise, but the Arabs of Palestine saw no
reason to forfeit what they considered their exclusive national rights, and determined
to block the partition with attacks against Jewish settlements, road
systems, and neighborhoods. Other Arab forces, most prominently those associated
with the militant Muslim Brotherhood, aided the Palestinian Arabs from
across the border. The Jews, for their part, initially showed restraint, but in
April 1948, fearing annihilation, they too went to war. Subsequently, dozens of
Arab villages and towns were destroyed, their populations displaced, and their
leaders either killed or rendered ineffective. But thePalestinians' defeat generated
sympathy throughout the Arab world and intensified the pressure on Arab
leaders to intervene against the Jews. The result came one month later with the
advent of the first Arab-Israeli war.

A remarkably similar process occurred more than fifty years later, in the
latter half of 2000, when the Clinton Administration again proposed to partition
the land between the Palestinians and the Jews. Specifically, the United
States called for the creation of a Palestinian state in virtually all of the West
Bank and the entire Gaza Strip—Israeli settlements would either be removed
or concentrated in blocks—with its capital in East Jerusalem. A small number
of Palestinian refugees would be repatriated to Israel; the rest were to receive
compensation. The Palestinian state would live side by side with Israel in relations
of full peace, but while Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak approved the
formula, the Palestinian Authority under its president, Yasser Arafat, rejected
it. Rather, Arafat demanded the return of all the refugees—a move that, if implemented,
would have created a Palestinian majority in Israel. As in 1947–48, the
issue was not merely the borders of the Jewish state, but its very existence.

The Palestinians consequently embarked on an armed offensive using tactics
reminiscent of those employed in 1947–48—roadside ambushes, snipers,
and car bombs—together with the innovation of suicide bombers. Militant Islamic
elements once more played a prominent role in the campaign. At first,
Israel's reaction was again restrained, but as casualties rapidly mounted, the
IDF finally struck back. In April 2002, Israeli forces reoccupied much of the
West Bank, causing extensive damage to Palestinian cities and villages, and
killing or isolating many Palestinian leaders. As in 1948, the Palestinians' plight
aroused sympathy in neighboring Arab countries and placed pressure on their
leaders to intercede. Soon Hezbollah guerrillas in Lebanon were launching
rockets into northern Israel; the Syrian army went on high alert, as did units in
Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq. Israel mobilized its reserves. The region careered toward
yet another Arab-Israeli war.

The fighting in 2000–2002 recalled not only the events of 1947–48 but,
even more poignantly, those of 1967. That war, this book asserts, was the result
of a series of incidents triggered by Palestinian guerrilla raids and Israel's
retaliations against them. Today, more than three decades later, the Middle
East is still in the grips of a context of conflict in which a single spark can ignite
a regional conflagration. Such a spark was kindled in September 2000, when
Ariel Sharon, then head of Israel's parliamentary opposition, paid a visit to the
Haram al-Sharif, or Temple Mount, in Jerusalem.

Though the visit had been cleared with the Palestinian Authority, many
Palestinians viewed it as a provocation and protested against it violently. Firing
on the rioters, Israeli forces provided the pretext for launching an intifada, or
popular uprising, named after the Haram's al-Aqsa mosque. Mass demonstrations
of Palestinian youths soon escalated into armed attacks against Israeli
targets, most of them civilian, and increasingly fierce countermeasures by Israel.
Israeli reprisals in turn instigated unrest in adjacent Arab countries. The
"street" was once again agitating—a déjà vu of 1967—and Arab rulers had little
choice but to act.

Unlike in 1948 and 1967, however, war between Arabs and Israelis did not
erupt in 2002. Though the region has remained in many ways unchanged, several
fundamental transformations nevertheless have combined to mitigate the
dangers of war.

There is, firstly, the existence of peace treaties between Israel and Egypt and
Israel and Jordan. In spite of their failure to bring about any true reconciliation
between their signatories, these agreements have nonetheless provided the nations
with open channels of communication and venues for reducing tensions.
Another change is the emergence of the U.S.-Israeli alliance that not only guarantees
Israel a decisive military edge over its enemies, but also affords Washington
far-reaching influence over Israeli actions. Finally, there is the nonconventional
weaponry now in the arsenals of virtually every Middle Eastern state, which has
sharply elevated the stakes in any Arab-Israeli confrontation.

Yet for every change curtailing the chances of war, another could equally
contribute to its outbreak. Absent today is the peculiar stability engendered by
the Cold War, of a rational counterpart whom the U.S. president might hotline
in a crisis, and superpower constraints over key regional players such as Iraq,
Iran, and Syria. The once neat division between Arab radicals and Arab conservatives
has been replaced by internal fissures within each Arab country—between
each regime and its domestic, often Islamic, opposition—and even the
lines in the Arab-Israeli conflict have become obscured. Most destabilizing,
arguably, is the growth of terrorist organizations, global in outlook and adamant
in their theology, transcending all borders and contemptuous of any attempt
to restrain them.

These countervailing changes, coupled with the continuing friction surrounding
nondemocratic Middle Eastern regimes and Arab resistance to the
very idea of a Jewish state, might have set the stage for an Arab-Israeli war
bigger and possibly more destructive than those of 1948 and 1967. Instead, war
in 2002 was averted by the timely intervention of the United States. As tensions
in the region spiraled toward an explosion, President George W. Bush
strongly advised Syria to rein in its Hezbollah allies and told the Palestinian
Authority that its support of terror was totally unacceptable to Americans. At
the same time, Washington publicly recognized Israel's right to defend itself
and convinced Israelis that they did not stand alone. Bush's actions—admonishing
the Arabs and reassuring the Israelis—were precisely those that Lyndon
B. Johnson failed to take in 1967, and in 2002 they succeeded in containing, if
not defusing, the crisis.

Like Johnson, Bush was engaged in an international struggle with an implacable
enemy—no longer communism, of course, but Islamic extremism—
but rather than tie his hands as Vietnam once had Johnson's, America's new
conflict impelled George Bush to act. The events of September 11, 2001, spurred
a radical departure from long-standing American policies toward the Middle East.
Having become the victim of large-scale Arab terror, the administration voiced
newfound empathy for Israel and its struggle against suicide bombers and gunmen,
and went so far as to identify Israel's enemies—Hamas and Islamic Jihad—
as America's. Moreover, in declaring war against international terrorism, in
dispatching its soldiers thousands of miles to fight in Afghanistan and, avowedly,
in Iraq, Washington could hardly deny Israel the ability to strike back in
the West Bank and Gaza, its own backyard. Concomitantly, American leaders
expressed severe reservations regarding the Arab states, even toward their traditional
allies, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, citizens of which were heavily implicated
in 9/11. Relations between the U.S. and the Arab world were further
strained by the Arabs' reluctance to support a military effort to invade Iraq and
oust its dictator, Saddam Hussein.

The success of Bush's effort to rally an anti-Saddam coalition is not, as of
this writing, guaranteed. Numerous obstacles, domestic and foreign, stand in
the president's way. Nor is it certain whether the toppling of Saddam will install
democracy or merely another dictatorship in Iraq, or whether war in the
gulf will ultimately enhance or further impair the area's stability. One fact,
alone, is incontestable: that the Middle East remains a flash point of multilateral
confrontation, a source of seemingly intractable controversies, and a powder
keg that the slightest spark could ignite. A context of conflict continues to
seize the region, demanding of its leaders almost constant displays of both courage
and caution.

November 2002

Copyright© 2003 by Michael B. Oren

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