Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes

Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes

ISBN-10:
184542476X
ISBN-13:
9781845424763
Pub. Date:
05/27/2007
Publisher:
Edward Elgar Publishing
ISBN-10:
184542476X
ISBN-13:
9781845424763
Pub. Date:
05/27/2007
Publisher:
Edward Elgar Publishing
Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes

Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes

Hardcover

$840.0 Current price is , Original price is $840.0. You
$840.00 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
  • PICK UP IN STORE
    Check Availability at Nearby Stores

Overview

The economics literature on pricing and pricing tactics has made huge progress in the last few decades mostly due to the influence of the asymmetric information and game theory revolutions in microeconomic theory. This authoritative two volume collection brings together some classic contributions which predate these revolutions, and older and newer papers which have employed these modern techniques to further our understanding of how pricing works in real world settings. Pricing Tactics, Strategies, and Outcomes approaches the subject mainly from the theoretical perspective, but includes also some important empirical papers. Important topics covered include entry deterrence, reputation formation, product line pricing, collusive behavior, tying and bundling, leasing, and sales and couponing strategies. The book should prove a useful reference tool for marketing students and faculty interested in the literature on pricing.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781845424763
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date: 05/27/2007
Series: Business Economics series , #6
Pages: 1304
Product dimensions: 6.62(w) x 9.62(h) x (d)

About the Author

About The Author
Edited by Michael Waldman, Charles H. Dyson Professor in Management and Professor of Economics, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, US and Justin P. Johnson, Associate Professor of Economics, Cornell University, US

Table of Contents

Contents

Acknowledgements

Introduction Michael Waldman and Justin P. Johnson

PART I CLASSICS
1. Peter O. Steiner (1957), ‘Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing’
2. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1966), ‘Peak-Load Pricing and Optimal Capacity under Indivisibility Constraints’
4. George J. Stigler (1968), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note on Block-Booking’
5. Walter Y. Oi (1971), ‘A Disneyland Dilemma: Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly’
6. R.H. Coase (1972), ‘Durability and Monopoly’
7. Reinhard Selten (1978), ‘The Chain Store Paradox’

PART II PRICING A PRODUCT LINE AND RELATED ISSUES
8. Michael Mussa and Sherwin Rosen (1978), ‘Monopoly and Product Quality’
9. Nancy L. Stokey (1979), ‘Intertemporal Price Discrimination’
10. Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984), ‘Monopoly with Incomplete Information’
11. Stephen W. Salant (1989), ‘When is Inducing Self-Selection Suboptimal for a Monopolist?’
12. Raymond J. Deneckere and R. Preston McAfee (1996), ‘Damaged Goods’
13. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1998), ‘Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks’
14. Justin P. Johnson and David P. Myatt (2003), ‘Multiproduct Quality Competition: Fighting Brands and Product Line Pruning’

PART III PRICING AND CONSUMER LEARNING
15. Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler (1981), ‘The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance’
16. Carl Shapiro (1982), ‘Consumer Information, Product Quality, and Seller Reputation’
17. Russell Cooper and Thomas W. Ross (1984), ‘Prices, Product Qualities and Asymmetric Information: The Competitive Case’
18. Kyle Bagwell and Michael H. Riordan (1991), ‘High and Declining Prices Signal Product Quality’
19. Tracy R. Lewis and David E.M. Sappington (1994), ‘Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination’
20. Patrick DeGraba (1995), ‘Buying Frenzies and Seller-induced Excess Demand’
21. James D. Dana, Jr. (1998), ‘Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets’

PART IV COLLUSIVE BEHAVIOR
22. Edward J. Green and Robert H. Porter (1984), ‘Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information’
23. B. Douglas Bernheim and Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior’
24. David Genesove and Wallace P. Mullin (2001), ‘Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case’
25. Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. (2004), ‘Cartel Pricing Dynamics in the Presence of an Antitrust Authority’
26. Susan Athey, Kyle Bagwell and Chris Sanchirico (2004), ‘Collusion and Price Rigidity’

PART V ENTRY DETERRENCE AND PREDATION
27. David M. Kreps and Robert Wilson (1982), ‘Reputation and Imperfect Information’
28. Paul Milgrom and John Roberts (1982), ‘Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis’
29. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (1986), ‘A “Signal-jamming” Theory of Predation’
30. Garth Saloner (1987), ‘Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information’
31. Kyle Bagwell and Garey Ramey (1991), ‘Oligopoly Limit Pricing’
32. Yun Joo Jung, John H. Kagel and Dan Levin (1994), ‘On the Existence of Predatory Pricing: An Experimental Study of Reputation and Entry Deterrence in the Chain-store Game’

Name Index


Volume II

Acknowledgements

An introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume I

PART I EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PRICING STRATEGIES
1. Dennis W. Carlton (1986), ‘The Rigidity of Prices’
2. Margaret E. Slade (1992), ‘Vancouver’s Gasoline-Price Wars: An Empirical Exercise in Uncovering Supergame Strategies’
3. Severin Borenstein and Andrea Shepard (1996), ‘Dynamic Pricing in Retail Gasoline Markets’
4. Sam Peltzman (2000), ‘Prices Rise Faster than They Fall’
5. Martin Pesendorfer (2002), ‘Retail Sales: A Study of Pricing Behavior in Supermarkets’
6. Aviv Nevo and Catherine Wolfram (2002), ‘Why Do Manufacturers Issue Coupons? An Empirical Analysis of Breakfast Cereals’

PART II LEASING
7. Jeremy I. Bulow (1982), ‘Durable-Goods Monopolists’
8. Scott E. Masten and Edward A. Snyder (1993), ‘United States versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits’
9. Michael Waldman (1997), ‘Eliminating the Market for Secondhand Goods: An Alternative Explanation for Leasing’
10. Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri (1999), ‘Interfering with Secondary Markets’
11. Igal Hendel and Alessandro Lizzeri (2002), ‘The Role of Leasing under Adverse Selection’
12. Justin P. Johnson and Michael Waldman (2003), ‘Leasing, Lemons, and Buybacks’

PART III TYING
13. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’
14. R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan and Michael D. Whinston (1989), ‘Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values’
15. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’
16. José Carbajo, David de Meza and Daniel J. Seidmann (1990), ‘A Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling’
17. Yannis Bakos and Erik Brynjolfsson (1999), ‘Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency’
18. Jay Pil Choi and Christodoulos Stefanadis (2001), ‘Tying, Investment, and the Dynamic Leverage Theory’
19. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’

PART IV SALES AND COUPONING STRATEGIES
20. Hal R. Varian (1980), ‘A Model of Sales’, American Economic Review, 70 (4), September, 651-9; Hal R. Varian (1981), ‘Errata: A Model of Sales’
21. Chakravarthi Narasimhan (1984), ‘A Price Discrimination Theory of Coupons’
22. Joel Sobel (1984), ‘The Timing of Sales’
23. Chakravarthi Narasimhan (1988), ‘Competitive Promotional Strategies’
24. Greg Shaffer and Z. John Zhang (1995), ‘Competitive Coupon Targeting’
25. Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole (2000), ‘Customer Poaching and Brand Switching’
26. J. Miguel Villas-Boas (2004), ‘Price Cycles in Markets with Customer Recognition’

Name Index
From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews