Lyndon Johnson's War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam

by Larry Berman

Overview

"Stunning....The portrait of the embattled and unyielding president that emerges is vivid and memorable."—Publishers Weekly

By 1968, the United States had committed over 525,000 men to Vietnam and bombed virtually all military targets recommended by the joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, the United States was no closer to securing its objectives than it had been prior to the Americanization of the war. The long-promised light at the end of the tunnel was a mirage. This absorbing account reveals the bankruptcy of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the failures of political reform in South Vietnam and the bitter bureaucratic conflicts between the US government and its military commanders.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780393307788
Publisher:	Norton, W. W. & Company, Inc.
Publication date:	04/17/1991
Edition description:	Reprint
Pages:	274
Product dimensions:	5.50(w) x 8.30(h) x 0.80(d)
Lexile:	1290L (what's this?)

About the Author

Larry Berman is the author of Planning a Tragedy, Lyndon Johnson's War, No Peace, No Honor, and Perfect Spy. He is professor emeritus at the University of California, Davis, and founding dean of the Honors College at Georgia State University in Atlanta.

Editorial Reviews

Berman discusses the reactions of LBJ and his advisors to the failure of military policy in Vietnam, the manipulation of intelligence from the field to portray success and the widening division between the hawks and the doves. ``The portrait of the embattled and unyielding president that emerges is vivid and memorable,'' said PW. Photos. (May)

Publishers Weekly - Publisher's Weekly

This sequel to Berman's Planning a Tragedy: The Americanization of the War in Vietnam ( LJ 5/1/82) covers the period from 1967 through Johnson's decision (March 1968) not to seek reelection. During this time, Johnson's administration debated, among other things, both a bombing halt and a significant increase in U.S. combat forces in Vietnam. Although little of the substance of these debates is new, documentary sources (some recently declassified) fill in many details. On the other hand, the author's argument that LBJ knew of and hid the truth about the ``Order of Battle'' figures is not supported by any evidence, and even could this theory be proven, it would not add materially to our understanding of the war, since Westmoreland's own manipulation of battle figures is already known. Appropriate for comprehensive Vietnam War collections.-- Kenneth W. Berger, Duke Univ. Lib., Durham, N.C.

Library Journal