Discourses

by Niccolò Machiavelli

Overview

Political and philosophical commentaries on the republic of ancient Rome from the Renaissance author of The Prince.
 
In Discourses, Italian statesman, philosopher, and writer Niccolò Machiavelli offers a wide-ranging analysis of the democratic underpinnings of the Roman Republic, based on the epic history written by Roman scholar Titus Livy.
 
Focusing on “a republic as the best way to secure the long term stability of states . . . the various discourses contain observations about aspects of governance, political powers, state safety, corruption, and the expansion of powers. They analyze types of governments and how they change over time from both internal and external pressures. The observations provide significant insights into our world today” (OpEdNews.com).

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781504062527
Publisher:	Open Road Media
Publication date:	04/21/2020
Sold by:	Barnes & Noble
Format:	eBook
Pages:	563
Sales rank:	247,374
File size:	3 MB

About the Author

Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an Italian historian, diplomat, and philosopher recognized as the father of modern political theory. An official of the Republic of Florence, he was forced out of office when the Medici family returned to power in 1512. He is best remembered for The Prince, the bold treatise on political strategy published five years after his death.
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) was an Italian historian, diplomat, and philosopher recognized as the father of modern political theory. An official of the Republic of Florence, he was forced out of office when the Medici family returned to power in 1512. He is best remembered for The Prince, the bold treatise on political strategy published five years after his death. 

Table of Contents

Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
Contents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at allContents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to Contents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
Book II.
Preface
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the Countries of othersContents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
Book II.
Preface
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of TownsContents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
Book II.
Preface
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers
Book III.
I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings
II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus
IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it
V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
VI. Of Conspiracies
VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood
VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition
IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all hazards
XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds
XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour
XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command
XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary
XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude
XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms
XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy Contents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
Book II.
Preface
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers
Book III.
I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings
II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus
IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it
V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
VI. Of Conspiracies
VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood
VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition
IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all hazards
XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds
XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour
XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command
XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary
XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude
XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms
XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain
XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory
XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome
XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude
XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens
XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States
XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided
XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds
XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince
XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy
XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the same spirit and bearing
XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible
XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your soldiers with confidence in one another and in you
XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince
XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the danger
XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women
XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy
XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide
XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places
XL. That Fraud is fair in War
XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and in either way is well defended
XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed
XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times nearly the same characterContents
Book I.
Preface
Chapter
I. Of the beginnings of Cities in General, and in particular of that of Rome
II. Of the various kinds of Government; and to which of them the Roman Commonwealth belonged
III. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That the dissensions between the Senate and Commons of Rome made Rome free and powerful
V. Whether they seek guardianship of public freedom is safer in the hands of the Commons or of the Nobles; and whether those who seek to acquire power, or they who seek to maintain it, are the greater cause of commotions
VI. Whether it was possible in Rome to contrive such a Government as would have composed the differences between the Commons and the Senate
VII. That to preserve liberty in a State, there must exist the right to accuse
VIII. That calumny is as hurtful in a Commonwealth as the power to accuse is useful
IX. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. That in proportion as the founder of a Kingdom or Commonwealth merits praise, he who founds a Tyranny deserves blame
XI. Of the Religion of the Romans
XII. That it is much of moment to make account of Religion; and that Italy, through the Roman Church, being wanting therein, has been ruined.
XIII. Of the use the Romans made of Religion in giving institutions to their City; in carrying out their enterprises; and in quelling tumults
XIV. That the Romans interpreted the auspices to meet the occasion; and made a prudent show of observing the rites of Religion even when forced to disregard them; and any who rashly slighted Religion they punished
XV. How the Samnites, as a last resource in their broken fortunes, had recourse in Religion
XVI. That a People accustomed to live under a Prince, if by any accident it become free, can hardly preserve that freedom
XVII. The a corrupt People obtaining freedom can hardly preserve it
XVIII. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. After a strong Prince a weak Prince may maintain himself: but after one weak Prince no Kingdom can stand a second
XX. That the consecutive reigns of two valiant Princes produce great results: and that well-ordered Commonwealths are assured of a succession of valiant Rulers by whom their power and growth are rapidly extended
XXI. That it is a great reproach to a Prince or to a Commonwealth to be without a National Army
XXII. What is to be noted in the combat of the three Roman Horatii and the three Alban Curiatii
XXIII. That we should never hazard our whole fortunes, where we put not forth our entire strength; for which reason to guard a defile is often hurtful
XXIV. That well-ordered States always provide rewards and punishments for their Citizens; and never set off deserts against misdeeds
XXV. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. That a new Prince in a city or province of which he has taken possession, ought to make everything new
XXVII. That Men seldom know how to be wholly good or wholly bad
XXVIII. Whence it came that the Romans were less ungrateful to their citizens than were the Athenians
XXIX. Whether a People or a Prince is the more ungrateful
XXX. How Princes and Commonwealths may avoid the vice of ingratitude; and how a Captain or Citizen may escape being undone by it
XXXI. That the Roman Captains were never punished with extreme severity for misconduct; and where loss resulted to the Republic merely through their ignorance or want of judgment, were not punished at all
XXXII. That a Prince or Commonwealth should not defer benefits until they are forced to yield them
XXXIII. When a mischief has grown up in, or against a State, it is safer to temporize with it than to meet it with violence
XXXIV. That the authority of the Dictator did good and not harm to the Roman Republic; and that it is, not those powers which are given by the free suffrages of the People, but those which ambitious Citizens usurp for themselves that are pernicious to a State
XXXV. Why the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, although brought about by the free and open suffrage of the Citizens, was hurtful to the liberties of that Republic
XXXVI. That Citizens who have held the higher offices of a Commonwealth should not disdain the lower
XXXVII. Of the mischief bred in Rome by the Agrarian Law: and how it is a great source of disorder in a Commonwealth to pass a law opposed to ancient usage with stringent retrospective effect
XXXVIII. That weak Republics are irresolute and undecided; and that the course they may take depends more on Necessity than Choice
XXXIX. That often the same accidents are seen to befall different Nations
XL. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to be noted. Wherein among other matters it is shown how the same causes may lead to the safety or to the ruin of a Commonwealth
XLI. That it is unwise to pass at a bound from leniency to severity, or to a haughty bearing from a humble
XLII. How easily men become corrupted
XLIII. That men fighting in their own cause make good and resolute Soldiers
XLIV. That the Multitude is helpless without a head: and that we should not with the same breath threaten and ask leave
XLV. That it is of evil example, especially in the maker of a law, not to observe the law when made: and that daily to renew acts of severity in a City is most hurtful to the Governor
XLVI. That men climb from one step of ambition to another, seeking at first to escape injury, and then to injure others
XLVII. That though men deceive themselves in generalities, in particulars they judge truly
XLVIII. He who would not have an office bestowed on some worthless or wicked person, should contrive that it be solicited by one who is utterly worthless and wicked, or else by one who is in the highest degree noble and good
XLIX. That if Cities which, like Rome, had their beginning in freedom, have had difficulty in framing such laws as would preserve their freedom, Cities which at the first have been in subjection will find this almost impossible
L. That neither any Council nor any Magistrate should have power to bring the Government of a City to a stay
LI. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done by choice
LII. That to check the arrogance of a Citizen who is growing too powerful in a State, there is no safer method, nor less open to objection, than to forestall him in those ways whereby he seeks to advance himself
LIII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises easily move them
LIV. Of the boundless authority which a great man may use to restrain an excited Multitude
LV. That the Government is easily carried on in a City wherein the body of the People is not corrupted: and that a Princedom is impossible where equality prevails, and a Republic where it does not
LVI. That when great calamities are about to befall a City or Country, signs are seen to presage, and seers arise who foretell them
LVII. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. That a People is wiser and more constant than a Prince
LIX. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That the Consulship and all the other Magistracies in Rome were given without respect to Age
Book II.
Preface
I. Whether the Empire acquired by the Romans was more due to Valour or to Fortune
II. With what Nations the Romans had to contend, and how stubborn these were in defending their Freedom
III. That Rome became great by destroying the Cities which lay round about her, and by readily admitting Strangers to the rights of Citizenship
IV. That Commonwealths have followed three methods for extending their power
V. That changes in Sects and Tongues, and the happening of Floods and Pestilences, obliterate the memory of the past
VI. Of the methods followed by the Romans in making War
VII. Of the quantity of land assigned by the Romans to each colonist
VIII. Why certain Nations leave their ancestral seats and overflow the Countries of others
IX. Of the Causes which commonly give rise to wars between States
X. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That it were unwise to ally yourself with a Prince who has reputation rather than strength
XII. Whether when Invasion is imminent it is better to anticipate or to await it
XIII. That Men rise from humble to high fortunes rather by Fraud than by Force
XIV. That Men often err in thinking they can subdue Pride by Humility
XV. That weak States are always dubious in their resolves; and that tardy resolves are always hurtful
XVI. That the Soldiers of our days depart widely from the methods of ancient Warfare
XVII. What importance the Armies of the present day should allow to Artillery; and whether the commonly received opinion concerning it be just
XVIII. That the authority of the Romans and the example of ancient warfare should make us hold Foot Soldiers of more account than Horse
XIX. That conquests made by ill governed States and such as follow not the valiant methods of the Romans, lend rather to their ruin than to their aggrandizement
XX. Of the dangers incurred by Princes or Republics who resort to Auxiliary or Mercenary Arms
XXI. That Capua was the first City to which the Romans sent a Prætor; nor there, until four hundred years after they began to make war
XXII. That in matters of moment Men often judge amiss
XXIII. That in chastising then Subjects when circumstances required it the Romans always avoided half measures
XXIV. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. That Taunts and Abuse breed hatred against him who uses them, without yielding him any advantage
XXVII. That prudent Princes and Republics should be content to have obtained a victory; for, commonly, when they are not, their victory turns to defeat
XXVIII. That to neglect the redress of Grievances, whether public or private, is dangerous for a Prince or Commonwealth
XXIX. That Fortune obscures the minds of Men when she would not have them hinder her designs
XXX. That really powerful Princes and Commonwealths do not buy Friendships with money, but with their valour and the fame of then prowess
XXXI. Of the danger of trusting banished men
XXXII. In how many ways the Romans gained possession of Towns
XXXIII. That the Romans entrusted the Captains of their Armies with the fullest Powers
Book III.
I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought back to its beginnings
II. That on occasion it is wise to feign folly
III. That to preserve a newly acquired freedom we must slay the Sons of Brutus
IV. That an Usurper is never safe in his Princedom while those live whom he has deprived of it
V. How an Hereditary King may come to lose his Kingdom
VI. Of Conspiracies
VII. Why it is that changes from Freedom to Servitude, and from Servitude to Freedom, are sometimes made without bloodshed, but at other times reek with blood
VIII. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed to its character and condition
IX. That to enjoy constant good fortune we must change with the times
X. That a Captain cannot escape battle when his Enemy forces it on him at all hazards
XI. That one who has to contend with many, though he be weaker than they, will prevail if he can withstand their first onset
XII. A prudent Captain will do what he can to make it necessary for his own Soldiers to fight, and to relieve his Enemy from that necessity
XIII. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army, or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. Of the effect produced in Battle by strange and unexpected Sights or Sounds
XV. That one and not many should head an Army; and why it is disadvantageous to have more leaders than one
XVI. That in times of difficulty true Worth is sought after whereas in quiet times it is not the most deserving but those who are recommended by wealth or connection who are most in favour
XVII. That we are not to offend a Man, and then send him to fill an important Office or Command
XVIII. That it is the highest quality of a Captain to be able to forestall the designs of his adversary
XIX. Whether indulgence or severity be more necessary for controlling a Multitude
XX. How one humane act availed more with the men of Falerii than all the might of the Roman Arms
XXI. How it happened that Hannibal pursuing a course contrary to that taken by Scipio, wrought the same results in Italy which the other achieved in Spain
XXII. That the severity of Manlius Torquatus and the gentleness of Valerius Corvinus won for both the same Glory
XXIII. Why Camillus was banished from Rome
XXIV. That prolonged Commands brought Rome to Servitude
XXV. Of the Poverty of Cincinnatus and of many other Roman Citizens
XXVI. How women are a cause of the ruin of States
XXVII. How a divided City may be reunited; and how it is a false opinion that to hold Cities in subjection they must be kept divided
XXVIII. That a Republic must keep an eye on what its Citizens are about; since often the seeds of a Tyranny lie hidden under a semblance of generous deeds
XXIX. That the faults of a People are due to its Prince
XXX. That a Citizen who seeks by his personal influence to render signal service to his Country, must first stand clear of Envy. How a City should prepare for its defence on the approach of an Enemy
XXXI That strong Republics and valiant Men preserve through every change the same spirit and bearing
XXXII. Of the methods which some have used to make Peace impossible
XXXIII. That to insure victory in battle, you must inspire your soldiers with confidence in one another and in you
XXXIV. By what reports, rumours, or surmises the Citizens of a Republic are led to favour a fellow-citizen: and whether the Magistracies are bestowed with better judgment by a People or by a Prince
XXXV. Of the danger incurred in being the first to recommend new measures; and that the more unusual the measures, the greater the danger
XXXVI. Why it has been and still may be affirmed of the Gauls, that at the beginning of a fray they are more than Men, but afterwards less than Women
XXXVII. Whether a general engagement should be preceded by skirmishes; and how, avoiding these, we may get knowledge of a new Enemy
XXXVIII. Of the Qualities of a Captain in whom his Soldiers can confide
XXXIX. That a Captain should have good knowledge of Places
XL. That Fraud is fair in War
XLI. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and in either way is well defended
XLII. That Promises made on compulsion are not to be observed
XLIII. That Men born in the same Province retain through all times nearly the same character
XLIV. That where ordinary methods fail, Hardihood and Daring often succeed
XLV. Whether in battle it is better to await and repel the enemy‘s attack, or to anticipate it by an impetuous onset
XLVI. How the Characteristics of Families come to be perpetuated
XLVII. That love of his Country should lead a good Citizen to forget private wrongs
XLVIII. That on finding an Enemy make what seems a grave blunder we should suspect some fraud to lurk behind
XLIX. That a Commonwealth to preserve its Freedom has constant need of new Ordinances. Of the services in respect of which Quintius Fabius received the surname of Maximus