A Connecticut Yankee in Lincoln's Cabinet: Navy Secretary Gideon Welles Chronicles the Civil War
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A Connecticut Yankee in Lincoln's Cabinet: Navy Secretary Gideon Welles Chronicles the Civil War
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Overview
The Civil War through the eyes of a key member of Lincoln's cabinet
Gideon Welles, the Connecticut journalist-politician who served as Lincoln's secretary of the navy, was not only an architect of Union victory but also a shrewd observer of people, issues, and events. Fortunately for posterity, he recorded many of his observations in his extensive diary. A Connecticut Yankee in Lincoln's Cabinet brings together 250 of the most important and interesting excerpts from the diary, dealing with topics as varied as the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the Marine Band's concerts in Washington's Lafayette Square, Lincoln's sense of humor, rivalries among cabinet members, Welles's often caustic opinions of prominent politicians and military leaders, demands for creation of a navy yard in his home state, the challenge of blockading 3,500 miles of Confederate coastline, the struggle against rebel commerce raiders, the battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, the Fort Pillow massacre of African American troops, and Lincoln's assassination. Together, the excerpts provide a candid insider's view of the Civil War as it unfolded, and an introduction provides the reader with context. Published by the Acorn Club.
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780819574985 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Wesleyan University Press |
| Publication date: | 12/13/2022 |
| Sold by: | Barnes & Noble |
| Format: | eBook |
| Pages: | 200 |
| File size: | 4 MB |
| Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
Read an Excerpt
CHAPTER 1
The Emancipation Proclamation and Beyond
Welles's entries on Lincoln's decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation constitute one of the diary's most important contributions to historical knowledge. In Section I of this chapter those entries are reproduced in their entirety. Section II consists of excerpts about a number of related topics, including the possible colonization of African Americans outside the United States, the enlistment in the army and navy of contrabands (slaves who fled to Union lines) and free-born blacks, the limits of the Emancipation Proclamation, the massacre of African American soldiers at Fort Pillow in Tennessee, and Congressional approval of the 13thAmendment abolishing slavery.
I
As Welles points out in the following excerpt, Secretary of State Seward and he were the first cabinet members Lincoln sounded out about the possible issuance of a proclamation freeing the slaves in the rebellious states. This was probably no accident. Although virtually all Republicans were opposed to slavery in principle, opinions about how to eliminate the institution ranged across a broad spectrum from gradual, state-initiated, compensated emancipation followed by the forced deportation of the former slaves, to immediate, federally mandated, uncompensated emancipation coupled with citizenship and equal rights for the freed people. It is likely that Lincoln viewed Welles and Seward as the cabinet's centrists – men who were generally less conservative than Interior Secretary Caleb Smith and the two border-state members, Attorney General Edward Bates and Postmaster General Montgomery Blair, but more conservative than Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase. As a centrist himself, Lincoln may well have wanted to try out the idea on his fellow centrists before soliciting the views of other cabinet members.
Undated: On Sunday, the 13th of July, 1862, President Lincoln invited me to accompany him in his carriage to the funeral of an infant child of Mr. Stanton. Secretary Seward and his daughter in law Mrs. Frederick Seward were also in the carriage. Mr. Stanton occupied at that time for a summer residence the house of a naval officer, I think Hazard, some two or three miles west, or northwest, of Georgetown. It was on this occasion and on this ride that he first mentioned to Mr. Seward and myself the subject of emancipating the slaves by proclamation in case the Rebels did not cease to persist in their war on the Government and the Union, of which he saw no evidence. He dwelt earnestly on the gravity, importance, and delicacy of the movement, said he had given it much thought and had about come to the conclusion that it was a military necessity absolutely essential for the salvation of the Union, that we must free the slaves or be ourselves subdued, etc., etc.
This was, he said, the first occasion when he had mentioned the subject to anyone, and wished us to frankly state how the proposition struck us. Mr. Seward said the subject involved consequences so vast and momentous that he should wish to give it mature reflection before giving a decisive answer, but his present opinion inclined to the measure as justifiable, and perhaps he might say expedient and necessary. These were also my views. Two or three times on that ride the subject was adverted to, and before separating the President desired us to give the question special and deliberate attention, for he was earnest in the conviction that something must be done. It was a new departure for the President, for until this time, in all our previous interviews, whenever the question of emancipation or the mitigation of slavery had been in any way alluded to, he had been prompt and emphatic in denouncing any interference by the General Government with the subject. This was, I think, the sentiment of every member of the Cabinet, all of whom, including the President, considered it a local, domestic question appertaining to the States respectively, who had never parted with their authority over it. But the reverses before Richmond, and the formidable power and dimensions of the insurrection, which extended through all the Slave States, and had combined most of them in a confederacy to destroy the Union, impelled the Administration to adopt extraordinary measures to preserve the national existence. The slaves, if not armed and disciplined, were in the service of those who were, not only as field laborers and producers, but thousands of them were in attendance upon the armies in the field, employed as waiters and teamsters, and the fortifications and intrenchments were constructed by them.
On July 22nd Lincoln informed the entire cabinet of his intention to issue a proclamation of emancipation. Oddly, Welles made no diary entry on that date. But in his October 1st entry he discussed the July 22nd meeting (and a related one on July 21st). By the time that entry was written, Lincoln had issued the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation (on September 22nd), giving the rebellious states 100 days (i.e., to January 1, 1863) to return to the Union, or else he would declare their slaves emancipated. The October 1st entry is reproduced below, followed by Welles's September 22nd entry about the cabinet's final discussion of the preliminary Proclamation preparatory to its issuance later that day. This departure from the chronological order of the diary is necessary in order to see the sequence of events as Welles observed them.
October 1, 1862: When it [Lincoln's proposal for a proclamation of emancipation] was first brought forward [to the entire cabinet] some six or eight weeks ago, all assented to it. It was pretty fully discussed at two successive Cabinet-meetings, and the President consulted freely, I presume, with the members individually. He did with me. Mr. Bates [a Missourian] desired that deportation, by force if necessary, should go with emancipation. Born and educated among the negroes, having always lived with slaves, he dreaded any step which should be taken to bring about social equality between the two races. The effect, he said, would be to degrade the whites without elevating the blacks. Demoralization, vice, and misery would follow. Mr. Blair [from Maryland], at the second discussion, said that, while he was an emancipationist from principle, he had doubts of the expediency of such a movement as was contemplated. Stanton, after expressing himself earnestly in favor of the step proposed, said it was so important a measure that he hoped every member would give his opinion, whatever it might be, on the subject; two had not spoken – alluding to Chase and myself.
I briefly alluded to the strong exercise of power involved in the question, and the denial of Executive authority to do this act, but the Rebels themselves had invoked war on the subject of slavery, had appealed to arms, and they must abide the consequences. It was an exercise of war powers, and I was willing to resort to extreme measures. The blow would fall heavy and severe on those loyal men in the Slave States who clung to the Union, but they must abide the results of a conflict which they had deplored, and unless they could persuade their fellow citizens to embrace the alternative presented [i.e., to end the rebellion forthwith], they must suffer with them. The slaves were now an element of strength to the Rebels – were laborers, producers, and army attendants; were considered as property by the Rebels, and, if property, were subject to confiscation; if not property, we should invite them as well as the [loyal southern] whites to unite with us in putting down the Rebellion. I had made known my views to the President and could say here I gave my approval of the Proclamation. Mr. Chase said it was going a step farther than he had proposed, but he was glad of it and went into a very full argument on the subject. I do not attempt to repeat it or any portion of it, nor that of others, farther than to define the position of each when this important question was before them. Something more than a Proclamation will be necessary, for this step will band the South together, and unite the Border States firmly with the Cotton States in resistance to the Government.
An important outcome of the July 22nd meeting Welles does not mention was Lincoln's acceptance of Seward's recommendation that issuance of the preliminary Proclamation be deferred until the Union's military situation improved, lest it be seen as an act of desperation. The Union victory at Antietam on September 17thcleared the way for Lincoln to issue it five days later.
September 22, 1862: A special Cabinet meeting. The subject was the Proclamation for emancipating the slaves after a certain date, in States that shall then be in rebellion. For several weeks the subject has been suspended, but the President says [it was] never lost sight of. When it was submitted, and now in taking up the Proclamation, the President stated that the question was finally decided, the act and the consequences were his, but that he felt it due to us to make us acquainted with the fact and to invite criticism on the paper which he had prepared. There were, he had found, some differences in the Cabinet, but he had, after consulting each and all, individually and collectively, formed his own conclusions and made his own decision. In the course of the discussion on this paper, which was long, earnest, and, on the general principle involved, harmonious, he remarked that he had made a vow, a covenant, that if God gave us the victory in the approaching battle [at Antietam], he would consider it an indication of Divine will, and that it was his duty to move forward in the cause of emancipation. It might be thought strange, he said, that he had in this way submitted the disposal of matters when the way was not clear to his mind what he should do. God had decided this question in favor of the slaves. He was satisfied it was right, was confirmed and strengthened in his action by the vow and the results. His mind was fixed, his decision made, but he wished his paper announcing his course [to be] as correct in terms as it could be made without any change in his determination. He read the document. One or two unimportant emendations suggested by Seward were approved. It was then handed to the Secretary of State to publish to-morrow. After this, Blair remarked that he did not concur in the expediency of the measure at this time, though he approved of the principle, and should therefore wish to file his objections. He stated at some length his views, which were that we ought not to put in greater jeopardy the patriotic element in the Border States, that the results of this Proclamation would be to carry over those States en masse to the Secessionists as soon as it was read, and that there was also a class of partisans in the Free States endeavoring to revive old parties, who would have a club put into their hands of which they would avail themselves to beat the Administration.
The President said he had considered the danger apprehended from the first objection, which was undoubtedly serious, but the objection was certainly as great not to act; as regarded the last, it had not much weight with him. The question of power, authority, in the Government to set free the slaves was not much discussed at this meeting, but had been canvassed by the President in private conversation with the members individually. Some thought legislation advisable before the step was taken, but Congress was clothed with no authority on this subject, nor is the Executive, except under the war power – military necessity, martial law, when there can be no legislation. This was the view which I took when the President first presented the subject to Seward and myself last summer as we were returning from the funeral of Stanton's child, a ride of two or three miles beyond Georgetown. Seward was at that time not at all communicative, and, I think, not willing to advise the movement. It is momentous both in its immediate and remote results, and an exercise of extraordinary power which cannot be justified on mere humanitarian principles, and would never have been attempted but to preserve the national existence. These were my convictions and this [was] the drift of the discussion. The effect which the Proclamation will have on the public mind is a matter of some uncertainty. In some respects it would, I think, have been better to have issued it when formerly first considered. There is an impression that Seward has opposed, and is opposed to, the measure. I have not been without that impression myself, chiefly from his hesitation to commit himself, and perhaps because action was suspended on his suggestion. But in the final discussion he has as cordially supported the measure as Chase.
For myself the subject has, from its magnitude and its consequences oppressed me, aside from the ethical features of the question. It is a step in the progress of this war which will extend into the distant future. The termination of this terrible conflict seems more remote with every movement, and unless the Rebels hasten to avail themselves of the alternative presented, of which I see little probability, the war can scarcely be other than one of subjugation. There is in the Free States a very general impression that this measure will insure a speedy peace. I cannot say that I so view it. No one in those States dare advocate peace as a means of prolonging slavery, if it is his honest opinion, and the pecuniary, industrial, and social sacrifice impending will intensify the struggle before us. While, however, these dark clouds are above and around us, I cannot see how the subject could be avoided. Perhaps it is not desirable it should be.
Apropos Welles's statement that Seward supported issuance of the preliminary Proclamation as "cordially" as Chase did, it will be seen in Chapter 2 that just two weeks before he issued the final Proclamation, Lincoln confronted a crisis precipitated by the attempt of a caucus of Republican senators to force him to oust the secretary of state. This was in part because many of the senators had the erroneous impression that Seward was exerting a "conservative" influence on the president with respect to emancipation. Chase, who was Seward's foremost rival for influence and power within the administration, had done much behind the scenes to give Republican senators this impression. There was even concern that if Seward had his way, Lincoln would not issue the final Proclamation on January 1st.
September 24, 1862: As I write, 9 P.M., a band of music strikes up on the opposite side of the square, a complimentary serenade to the President for the [preliminary] Emancipation Proclamation. The document has been in the main well received, but there is some violent opposition, and the friends of the measure have made this demonstration to show their approval.
December 29, 1862: At the meeting to-day, the President read the draft of his Emancipation Proclamation, invited criticism, and finally directed that copies should be furnished to each [cabinet member]. It is a good and well-prepared paper, but I suggested that part of the sentence marked in pencil be omitted. Chase advised that fractional parts of States ought not be exempted. In this I think he is right, and so stated. Practically, there would be difficulty in freeing parts of States and not freeing others – a clashing between central and local authorities.
December 31, 1862: We had an early and special Cabinet-meeting, convened at 10 A.M. The subject was the Proclamation of to-morrow to emancipate the slaves in the Rebel States. Seward proposed two amendments, one including mine, and one enjoining upon, instead of appealing to, those emancipated, to forbear from tumult. Blair had, like Seward and myself, proposed the omission of a part of a sentence and made other suggestions which I thought improvements. Chase made some good criticisms and proposed a felicitous closing sentence. The President took the suggestions, written in order, and said he would complete the document.
January 1, 1863: The Emancipation Proclamation is published in this evening's Star. This is a broad step, and will be a landmark in history. The immediate effect will not be all its friends anticipate or its opponents apprehend. Passing events are steadily accomplishing what is here proclaimed. The character of the country is in many respects undergoing a transformation. This must be obvious to all, and I am content to await the results of events, deep as they may plough their furrows in our once happy land. This great upheaval which is shaking our civil fabric was perhaps necessary to overthrow and subdue the mass of wrong and error which no trivial measure could eradicate. The seed which is being sown will germinate and bear fruit, and tares and weeds will also spring up under the new dispensation.
(Continues…)
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Table of Contents
Introduction
Editorial Note
The Emancipation Proclamation and Beyond
Cabinet Problems and Cabinet Crisis
Welles on Lincoln
Taking the Measure of Men
Generals and Admirals at War
Navy Department Challenges
Home-State Matters
Sidelights and Personal Notes
Reflections on the War
Lincoln's Assassination
Afterword
Appendix: Members of Lincoln's Cabinet
Members of the Acorn Club
What People are Saying About This
“With a keen editorial eye and a deep knowledge of the Civil War, J. Ronald Spencer has selected key passages from Gideon Welles’s extraordinary diary and organized them topically. The result allows readers to eavesdrop on the central dramas of the day as the Secretary of the Navy confided his feelings about Lincoln, the cabinet, various admirals and generals, the meaning of the war, and issues in his home state of Connecticut. This edition of Welles’s diary should be required reading for all students of military and political history.”
“J. Ronald Spencer has judiciously selected the most historically significant passages from Welles’s invaluable diary, handily arranged them by subject, provided a thoughtful introduction, and thus created a compact, user-friendly edition which will be welcomed by everyone interested in Lincoln and the Civil War.”
“Ronald Spencer has offered readers a remarkable gift with his masterful summary of Gideon Welles’s striking importance to Connecticut and the nation. The brief introductions to each of the diary entries provide clarity and power to Welles’s own words.”