The Other Missiles of October: Eisenhower, Kennedy, and the Jupiters, 1957-1963 / Edition 1

by Philip Nash

Overview

Shedding important new light on the history of the Cold War, Philip Nash tells the story of what the United States gave up to help end the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. By drawing on documents only recently declassified, he shows that one of President Kennedy's compromises with the Soviets involved the removal of Jupiter missiles from Italy and Turkey, an arrangement concealed from both the American public and the rest of the NATO allies. Nash traces the entire history of the Jupiters and explores why the United States offered these nuclear missiles, which were capable of reaching targets in the Soviet Union, to its European allies after the launch of Sputnik. He argues that, despite their growing doubts, both Eisenhower and Kennedy proceeded with the deployment of the missiles because they felt that cancellation would seriously damage America's credibility with its allies and the Soviet Union. The Jupiters subsequently played a far more significant role in Khrushchev's 1962 decision to deploy his missiles in Cuba, in U.S. deliberations during the ensuing missile crisis, and in the resolution of events in Cuba than most existing histories have supposed.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780807846476
Publisher:	The University of North Carolina Press
Publication date:	10/27/1997
Edition description:	1
Pages:	256
Product dimensions:	6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.57(d)
Lexile:	1490L (what's this?)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Philip Nash is visiting assistant professor of history at Middle Tennessee State University.

Table of Contents

Contents

Acknowledgments
Abbreviations Used in Text

Introduction
1. We Cannot Deny Them to Our Allies: Eisenhower's IRBM Offer to NATO, 1957
2. Trying to Dump Them on Our Allies: The Search for Hosts, 1957-1959
3. Farce and Statecraft: Soldiers, Experts, Lawmakers, and Torch Passers, 1959-1961
4. The Old Frontier: Kennedy and the Jupiters, 1961-1962
5. Goddamn Dangerous: The Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962
6. A Very Tidy Job: Taking Them Out, 1962-1963
Conclusion

Notes
Works Cited
Index

Illustrations

President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
NATO heads of government meeting, Paris, December 1957
General Lauris Norstad, USAF, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Three-missile Jupiter launch position, Turkey, 1963
President John F. Kennedy and Soviet premier Nikita S. Khrushchev, Vienna, June 1961
Jupiter missile in Turkey, 1963
Meeting of the Executive Committee, National Security Council, October 1962
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and President Kennedy, October 1962
President Kennedy and Italian prime minister Amintore Fanfani, January 1963
Dismantled Italian Jupiter missile being readied for transport, April 1963

Maps and Tables

Maps
1. The Superpowers and Their Allies, 1957-1963
2. IRBM Deployments in NATO, 1959-1963

Tables
1. Achievement of Operational Status, Jupiter Launch Positions, Italy
2. Achievement of Operational Status, Jupiter Launch Positions, Turkey

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

An excellent and very well written account. . . . This highly readable account should be of interest to students of American foreign policy, NATO, the Cuban Missile Crisis, or either of the two presidential administrations.—History: Reviews of New Books



The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was prompted by Soviet deployment of nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba and the insistence of the United States on their withdrawal. One less-known aspect of the crisis was the role of similar U.S. missiles earlier deployed in Turkey, which became the 'other missiles of October' when the Soviet leaders in turn sought their removal. This well-researched study, drawing on newly available archival sources, traces not only the secret U.S. agreement on and then withdrawal of these missiles, but also the story of how and why, under the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations, despite growing misgivings, the U.S. missiles came to be in Turkey. It is interesting, good history, and a good read.—Raymond L. Garthoff, author of Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis

Editorial Reviews

It is interesting, good history, and a good read.

Raymond L. Garthoff, author of "Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis"

"It is interesting, good history, and a good read.

Raymond L. Garthoff, author of "Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis""

An excellent and very well written account.

"History: Reviews of New Books"

From the Publisher