Do Members of Congress Reward Their Future Employers?: Evaluating the Revolving Door Syndrome / Edition 1

Do Members of Congress Reward Their Future Employers?: Evaluating the Revolving Door Syndrome / Edition 1

by Adolfo Santos
ISBN-10:
0761833293
ISBN-13:
9780761833291
Pub. Date:
11/22/2005
Publisher:
University Press of America
ISBN-10:
0761833293
ISBN-13:
9780761833291
Pub. Date:
11/22/2005
Publisher:
University Press of America
Do Members of Congress Reward Their Future Employers?: Evaluating the Revolving Door Syndrome / Edition 1

Do Members of Congress Reward Their Future Employers?: Evaluating the Revolving Door Syndrome / Edition 1

by Adolfo Santos

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Overview

Increasingly, former members of Congress are finding their way back into the corridors of power representing the very interest groups they once regulated. This post-congressional lobbying activity has proven to be very lucrative for many ex-lawmakers. As lobbyists, former members of Congress carry significant clout that gives them access not only to their former colleagues in the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate, but also to members of the executive branch. While generally the practice of walking through the "revolving door" has been discussed as unseemly, a bigger danger is that members of Congress might sponsor legislation that benefits their future employers.

This book looks at the question of whether members of Congress reward their future employers with public policy. The book evaluates the extent to which former members of Congress become lobbyists, and the implications of this career choice on pubic policy. Of concern is whether or not members of Congress with post-congressional lobbying ambitions are using their positions to maximize the interests of those they plan to serve once they leave office. The evidence will show that lawmakers who become lobbyists not only behave differently in the legislative arena than those who do not become lobbyists, but also lobby on behalf of the very interests they once regulated in Congress.

The book begins with a discussion on the intentions of the framers of the Constitution to constrain ambition. It then proceeds to show who becomes a lobbyist and how post-congressional lobbyists exploit their relationships with their former colleagues as they lobby on behalf of special interests. The book concludes by suggesting that post-congressional lobbying not only has the potential to undermine sound public policy, it also has the potential to jeopardize the legitimacy of the institution.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780761833291
Publisher: University Press of America
Publication date: 11/22/2005
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 182
Product dimensions: 6.92(w) x 8.94(h) x 0.59(d)

About the Author

Adolfo Santos is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Houston-Downtown. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Houston. His research focuses on the U.S. Congress, minority representation, and state and local elections.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1 Preface Chapter 2 Introduction Chapter 3 James Madison and the Revolving Door Chapter 4 The Context Chapter 5 Former Members of Congress as Lobbyists- Who Becomes a Lobbyist? Chapter 6 Sending Signals or Rewarding Future Employers with Bill Sponsorship Chapter 7 Public Policy and the Interest Group Connection- Five Case Studies Chapter 8 Post-Congressional Lobbying, National Security and Institutional Legitimacy Chapter 9 Conclusion Chapter 10 References Chapter 11 Index
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