A Course in Game Theory / Edition 1

A Course in Game Theory / Edition 1

ISBN-10:
0262650401
ISBN-13:
9780262650403
Pub. Date:
07/12/1994
Publisher:
MIT Press
ISBN-10:
0262650401
ISBN-13:
9780262650403
Pub. Date:
07/12/1994
Publisher:
MIT Press
A Course in Game Theory / Edition 1

A Course in Game Theory / Edition 1

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Overview

A Course in Game Theory presents the main ideas of game theory at a level suitable for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, emphasizing the theory's foundations and interpretations of its basic concepts. The authors provide precise definitions and full proofs of results, sacrificing generalities and limiting the scope of the material in order to do so. The text is organized in four parts: strategic games, extensive games with perfect information, extensive games with imperfect information, and coalitional games. It includes over 100 exercises.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780262650403
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 07/12/1994
Series: The MIT Press
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 368
Sales rank: 451,337
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.85(d)
Age Range: 18 Years

About the Author

Martin J. Osborne is Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto.

Ariel Rubinstein is Professor of Economics at Tel Aviv University and New York University.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
I. Strategic Games
2. Nash Equilibrium
3. Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium
4. Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions
5. Knowledge and Equilibrium

II. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
6. Extensive Games with Perfect Information
7. Bargaining Games
8. Repeated Games
9. Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games
10. Implementation Theory

III. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
11. Extensive Games with Imperfect Information
12. Sequential Equilibrium

IV. Coalitional Games
13. The Core
14. Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value
15. The Nash Solution

List of Results
References
Index

What People are Saying About This

Robert J. Aumann

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein have made most of their theoretical contributions on the strategic side, and yet they devote a nice portion of the book to cooperative game theory. I recommend this book highly. It is beautifully done, and it recognized the importance of the cooperative theory.

Endorsement

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein have made most of their theoretical contributions on the strategic side, and yet they devote a nice portion of the book to cooperative game theory. I recommend this book highly. It is beautifully done, and it recognized the importance of the cooperative theory.

Robert J. Aumann, Professor of Mathematics, The HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem

From the Publisher

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein have made most of their theoretical contributions on the strategic side, and yet they devote a nice portion of the book to cooperative game theory. I recommend this book highly. It is beautifully done, and it recognized the importance of the cooperative theory.

Robert J. Aumann, Professor of Mathematics, The HebrewUniversity of Jerusalem

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